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Abstract
Rightly or wrongly the ECB is widely perceived as in-transparent.  Our analysis suggests that
on formal criteria the ECB is more transparent and accountable than most other central banks.
What could be done to improve the transparency of the ECB?
The best way to make the ECB more accountable is to engage it in substantive discussions about
its policy where it is pressed to provide the relevant information about the background analysis
that have led to policy decisions. For example, the ECB should be pressed to make its inflation
forecast public and it should be more open about the arguments, both pro and con, that shape the
debates that precedes decisions. Accountability cannot be ensured by the ECB alone. An
important role has to be played by its counterparts, such as the European Parliament, the
Council of EU Finance Ministers and the public at large.
Publication of detailed minutes of the ECB Governing Council meetings would not be useful.
This would only result in shifting the true debate to informal meetings of the Governing
Council, so that the formal meetings would only record pre-packaged consensus with no or little
discussion.
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Introduction
The European Central Bank is formally, and also de facto one, of the most independent
central banks in the world. Such an unprecedented degree of independence is considered by
some, however, as a cause for concern unless it is accompanied by adequate accountability.  The
present paper examines the extent to which this is the case.
The paper is organized as follows: first two sections explore the concept of
accountability. The third tries to define the acts and procedures through which central banks
perform their accountability. The fourth section, which might be of most interest to most
readers, compares the accountability of the ECB with that of three other central banks: the
Federal Reserve Bank of the US, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England. The aim is not to
rank central banks according to a pre-determined index of accountability. Accountability can be
performed in different ways and through different practices and procedures, depending on the
interaction between the central bank and the other institutions of society, their respective roles
and the environment within which they interact, in particular the structure of financial markets
and the instruments used by the central bank in the conduct of monetary policy. There is thus no
one single model of accountability that can be applied to all central banks in all cases and
circumstances. It is nevertheless of importance to assess the extent to which the ECB gives an
adequate account of its activities.  Section 5 concludes with some ideas on how to improve the
accountability and transparency of the ECB.
1. Democratic control, independence and accountability
This paper builds on the literature on central bank independence and legitimacy which has been
widely developed in recent years. All caveats, related in particular to the limitations and
simplifications of the theoretical underpinnings of this line of research, must be kept in mind in
reading this study.
A couple of clarifications may be worth making as a preliminary step towards the
analysis of central bank accountability: the first concerns the concept of accountability itself; the
second, its relationship with independence.
The concepts of democratic control and democratic accountability
1 are often confused.
Democratic control refers to the following three constraints on the exercise of government:
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•  Ex-ante control defines the rules, standards and principles laid down in advance by a
democratically elected body, to be followed by the accountable body in the exercise of its
functions.
•  Accountability is the act of listening to criticism and responding to questions about the past
and future behavior that may be put forward by a democratically elected body.
•  Popular mandate refers to the attribution of power through democratic procedures.
The above criteria, which define the way democratic control is generally exercised, cannot be
fully applied to central banks. The third criterion, in particular, is not relevant in that
independent central banks do not receive popular mandates nor do they choose their own policy
objectives. This would imply that the central bank had become a new separate branch of
democratic power. Instead, central banks receive their mandate from the government or through3
a legal act, to perform specific tasks in view of specific objectives. The first two criteria (ex-ante
control and accountability) however, do apply to central banks.
The way in which accountability is exercised is closely related to the concept of
independence of the central bank. The ex-ante control over a central bank which is not
independent can be effected in the context of the general conduct of the government’s economic
policy. The rules and principles underlying such control may be constantly revised, depending
on the circumstances faced by the executive branch of government and on its policy goals. For
instance, monetary policy may be geared in turn towards the objective of price stability or
towards stimulating economic growth, depending on the wishes of the government. There is no
need in this case to precisely specify in advance the tasks and objectives of monetary policy.
Before its recent reform, the Bank of England was not subject to precise rules or guidelines, as
suggested by Roll et al. (1993):
The so-called Parliamentary accountability for monetary policy connotes no more that the
presence of the topic in a general and continuing Parliamentary debate about the
government’s economic performance, a debate whose real constitutional function is to furnish
information relevant to the quinquennial popular control by elections.
3
For an independent central bank, the way in which accountability is exercised needs to
be precisely defined. Independence can be granted only if clear rules and principles are laid
down to define the boundaries of central bank action. Ex-ante control is a necessary condition
for delegating power. If the central bank could choose its own goals and policies, it would
become a political body that could not be independent from government. The issue is thus to
define the ‘optimal contract’ for the central bank in a satisfactory way.
4 Such a contract must
ensure that the central bank is given the appropriate incentives to pursue its statutory goals. The
rules and principles for central bank action can thus not be continuously changed by the
government according to specific and changeable interests.
Accountability aims at verifying that the rules and principles laid down for the central
bank are respected. The way in which accountability is performed is linked to the way ex-ante
control is specified. If ex-ante control is defined with a low degree of precision, for instance
including escape clauses, accountability can only be of poor quality. If the objective of a central
bank is not clearly specified, the reporting will only be vague and will not allow any association
between monetary policy decisions and the bank’s final performance. When escape clauses are
set, which allow the central bank under unspecified circumstances to deviate from its targets,
bad performance can be easily justified ex-post. The public is not in a position to assess the
effective contribution of the central bank to the achievement of the specific objective. This
undermines the accountability of the central bank. When the mandate of a central bank is clearly
and precisely defined, the public can focus on its performance. Accountability can be exercised
on the basis of precise performance indicators.
In sum, contrary to the views expressed in some quarters, there is no a priori trade-off
between independence and accountability, if the two concepts are appropriately defined.
Accountability can be seen as a complement, if not a necessary requirement for independence.
A central bank cannot be made fully independent if its objectives are not clearly and precisely
defined; it cannot remain independent if it does not give a public account of its actions.
Another issue that has been discussed in the literature is whether accountability can be
distinguished from transparency. Accountability refers to the legal obligation to give an account
of a bank’s actions and performance, which derives from the delegation of power.
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Transparency goes beyond the fulfillment of a given reporting requirement and refers to ‘more
subtle forms of accountability’ related to the ‘way of doing business’. This distinction is to
some extent artificial, at least in the case of the ECB, since its objectives and tasks are clearly
defined in the Maastricht Treaty. Although the ECB has precise reporting obligations, its
accountability can be understood in a very general sense, to be exercised not only to the Council
or the Parliament, but to the public at large. This interpretation is consistent with Article 2 of the
ECB Statute, which specifies that ‘the ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an
open market economy with free competition, favoring an efficient allocation of resources...’ A
broad interpretation of the concept of accountability, not restricted to legal requirements but
extended to the broader concept of transparency and openness of monetary policy, seems thus
appropriate for the European Central Bank.
2. The economics of central bank accountability
Central bank performance can be assessed by observing the results of its policies. If the primary
objective of monetary policy is price stability, the assessment of central bank performance can
be based on the regular observation of inflation statistics. Given the time lag between the setting
of monetary policy and its actual effect on price levels, however, observation of the latter
enables us to assess actions taken about two years earlier. This of course is of little interest to
market participants and the public at large.
Two further elements complicate the exercise of accountability. The first is that
inflation is a monetary phenomenon in the long run, but not at each and every point in time.
Inflation is affected by several variables, such as labor costs, import prices and taxes, which are
beyond the control of the central bank and are difficult to forecast. The central bank can thus not
be held accountable for temporary deviations from price stability which are not due to its own
behavior. On the other hand, how can market participants know if such deviations are temporary
or not, and whether they are due to monetary factors or to some other cause? These questions,
which lie at the root of the problem of central bank accountability, can be regrouped into three
main broad areas.
The first is the well known issue of time inconsistency of the optimal monetary policy
6.
lthough a price stability-oriented monetary policy is optimal in the long run, it is not optimal in
the short term in the absence of unexpected shocks Welfare may temporarily increase if the
central bank deviates from its long-term objective and conducts an unexpected monetary
expansion that would bring about higher growth and lower unemployment, even at the expense
of higher inflation. The incentive to deviate from the optimal long-term policy is known to
economic agents, which anticipate this temptation. The central bank is thus led to conduct a
more expansionary policy than desired, with a sub-optimal inflation result for society. The
stronger is the reputation enjoyed by a central bank, the greater may be the gains obtained from
temporarily deviating from its long-term objective.
The problem is made more acute by the fact that in the short term the rate of inflation
may be affected by other factors than just monetary policy, such as wage shocks and changes in
public expenditure or import prices. The simple observation of the price level does not enable
market participants to understand whether the deviation from price stability, if and when it
occurs, is temporary or permanent and whether it is due to a non-monetary shock or to the
intention of the central bank to effect a surprise monetary expansion with a view to stimulating
the economy.5
In this context, the literature has analyzed the issue of central bank ‘secrecy’ or
‘ambiguity’.
7 If only unanticipated monetary policy is effective in influencing output and
employment, disclosing partial information may be interpreted by market participants as the
wish of the central bank to keep some information private, so as to retain the possibility of
springing inflationary surprises.
8 This line of reasoning has been used, in particular by the
Federal Reserve, to justify the fact that information about the FOMC meetings should not be
disclosed as requested by some market participants.
9 This view may be justified for a central
bank such as the Fed, which is not fully independent and whose primary objective is not price
stability but also to support economic growth. A central bank that is obliged to focus on price
stability as its primary objective, and thus cannot conduct an active stabilization policy, should
benefit from disclosing information that might be used by market participants to interpret
current developments.
Accountability can be seen as a part of a commitment technology by which the central
bank provides economic agents with symmetric information, and thus deprives itself of the
possibility to follow a different policy from the one it has announced, with a view to enhancing
the credibility of its action. It is noteworthy that the issue of accountability has been promoted
in particular by central banks whose statutes have changed and that have no track record.
To summarize the above arguments, transparency increases the credibility of the central
bank, especially when the latter does not enjoy a particularly high reputation. It thus enables the
central bank to conduct a less restrictive monetary policy than would otherwise be required.
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Transparency and accountability increase the overall welfare of the economy.
The second argument for accountability is linked to the previous one and arises from the
distributive effects produced by monetary policy decisions, in particular unanticipated ones.
Unexpected interest rate changes can produce a significant redistribution of wealth between
debtors and creditors. The small increase in the fed fund rate decided by the Federal Reserve in
early 1994 was sufficient to wipe out most of the profits of the large investment banks for that
year. Such redistributive effects may take place not only across sectors and agents, but also
across regions. They may be exacerbated if different groups of society have different
information about the intentions and the behavior of the central bank.
If the central bank is dependent from the government, the distributive effects may be
linked to explicit political decisions, and possibly compensated through other policy
instruments. In this context, the secrecy surrounding central bank decisions can be justified as a
way to achieve the desired income distribution objective. An independent central bank, which
has no income distribution objective, must prevent a situation in which private information
concerning its actions is made available to certain groups of society and not to others. This
aspect is particularly relevant in a highly decentralized economy such as the European one,
where the decision-making process may be seen as distant and may not be fully understood by
some sectors of society. Without the necessary transparency, the suspicion may arise that the
interests of some parties are given more attention than others.
11 This would clearly be to the
detriment of European Central Bank’s credibility. To avoid this suspicion, information should
be disseminated with similar intensity, frequency and depth across the economy. This can be
more easily done in an atmosphere of disclosure and accountability than one of secrecy.
The third reason for accountability is that it facilitates cooperative behavior between
economic agents, thereby achieving Pareto-superior social welfare. In the presence of
uncertainty, the availability of information from the central bank enables economic agents to6
extract information not only on aggregate developments but also on their own behavior, relative
to the rest of society. Agents can thus modify their behavior or try to influence that of the other
components of society. This argument applies in particular to decentralized economies, where
agents have difficulty in coordinating their actions and expectations. For instance, if the ECB
anticipated that the government of one of the large EU states was in the process of launching a
major public expenditure plan, with potential inflationary pressures for the whole Union, it
could consider increasing interest rates, possibly in a pre-emptive way. In this case, it would be
desirable to publicly spell out such policy intentions, possibly in advance of the decision. This
would give the government in question the opportunity to reconsider its policy action. The other
countries would also have the opportunity to try to influence the undisciplined country, since
the effects of the latter’s policies would be borne by all. Indeed, the increase of the Union’s
interest rate would have restrictive consequences on all countries, including those ‘that are
fiscally disciplined’. The outcome of a re-consideration of the initial policy intention would lead
to a more efficient solution than the one contemplated in the case of an ex-post reaction by the
central bank.
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The same reasoning can be applied to other shocks, such as for instance asymmetric
wage and price developments. Central bank transparency contributes to cooperative equilibrium
between economic agents, which is a Pareto-improvement. Central banks are aware of this fact,
and often use their communication channels with market participants to ‘guide’ them on
possible policy developments. Central banks have at times even ‘threatened’ to increase interest
rates if wage negotiations were concluded that were inconsistent with price stability or if budget
projections were overshot.
3.  How to assess central bank accountability?
The easy way to assess central bank accountability is to create an indicator as in the literature on
central bank independence. Briault et al. (1996) have followed this route and created an
accountability index based on four criteria: a) whether the central bank is subject to external
monitoring by Parliament; b) whether the minutes are published of the meetings in which
monetary policy is decided; c) whether the central bank publishes an inflation or monetary
policy report of some kind, in addition to the standard central bank bulletins; and d) whether
there is a clause that allows the government to override a decision of the central bank.
In our view, these criteria are unsatisfactory. They oversimplify the process and thereby
give an incomplete picture of the framework within which accountability is exercised. In
particular, the last criterion seems more appropriate for evaluating central bank independence
than accountability. The possibility of overriding the central bank is unrelated to ex-ante control
and thus to accountability. Cukierman (1992) includes this criterion in the index of legal
independence. The third criterion is also dubious; it is not clear why an inflation report would
necessarily ensure any more accountability than would be achieved through the regular monthly
reports, if the latter contained the necessary information.
We examine a different set of criteria, derived from the concepts of ex-ante control and
accountability discussed in the first section. Our aim is not to create a numerical index, but
rather to examine the ways and opportunities that central banks use to interact with public
opinion, market participants and the other institutions in society. We consider 15 criteria of
central bank accountability, divided into three main groups (see Table 1):7
•  Ex-ante accountability,
•  Ex-post accountability and
•  Procedures.
The first criterion in the first grouping consists of a clear definition of the objective of
price stability. This concerns in particular the way in which price stability is defined, the type of
price index to be used as a final target, the precision of the target (a point estimate as opposed to
a range) and the horizon of the target. The more precise is the target, the more accountable a
central bank can be held. This criterion has to be viewed against the well known and
documented difficulties to correctly measure inflation. There is clearly a trade-off between the
simplicity of the public announcement, which enhances transparency, and the complexity of the
inflation phenomenon.153
Table 1 Accountability criteria
Federal Reserve Bank of Japan Bank of England ECB
Ex-Ante
1. Clear definition of the objective of price
stability
2. Announcement of the operational target
3. Announcement of intermediate target
4. Announcement of indicators for
assessing monetary policy
5. Explanation of how monetary policy
targets affect other policies &
objectives
no
fed fund rate
no
monitoring ranges for
money and credit
aggregates
implicitly
no
overnight lending
rate
no
no specific one
implicitly
Government (2.5% CPIX
inflation for 1998)
repo rate
direct inflation target
no specific one
implicitly
Treaty/ECB less than 2%
CPI inflation
overnight rate
no
reference ranges for
monetary aggregates
implicitly
Ex-post
6. Publication of data on intermediate
target or  explanation of possible
deviation
7. Publication of inflation forecast and
deviation from target
8. Explanation of main policy measures
(or absence thereof) and underlying
reasons
9. Explanation of how these measures
affect other policies
money and
credit aggregates
twice a year
(for the HH reports)
yes
no
no
no
yes
no
yes, inflation report
yes, inflation report
yes
no
no
no
yes
no154
Table 1, cont. Accountabilitity criteria
Federal Reserve Bank of Japan Bank of England ECB
Procedures
10. Regular (monthly, quarterly, yearly)
public reports covering issues 1-8 above
11. Hearings in parliament with Q&A
12. Participation of government
         representative at meeting of the decision-
making bodies (as observers)
13. Publication of summary minutes
14. Publication of detailed minutes
15. Publication of the votes of the members
of the decision-making bodies
monthly
at least twice a year
no
7 weeks later
5 years later
7 weeks later
monthly
at least twice a year
Ministry of Finance and of
Economic Planning
Agency
one month later
to be decided
one month later
quarterly inflation report
yes, regular
Treasury representative
6 weeks later
-
6 weeks later
monthly
quarterly
President of ECOFIN
and Commission
no
no
no155
Nevertheless, complexity cannot be used as an excuse for not defining the target,
as this would give rise to the suspicion by market participants that other policy targets are
being followed. This would lead to a loss of credibility for the central bank.
The second criterion is the announcement of an operational target. A clear
understanding by market participants of which operational target the central bank uses to
conduct its monetary policy operations enables a frequent monitoring of a central bank’s
actions. Market participants should be able to clearly distinguish between the instruments
of monetary policy, such as the ‘official’ or ‘policy’ interest rate, and the operational target
that is affected by a central bank’s actions but is ultimately determined by market
conditions. If such a distinction cannot be made, market participants have less information
about a central bank’s actions.
The third criterion is the announcement of an intermediate target. Given the time
lag, estimated to be around 18 to 24 months, between implementation of monetary policy
and its effects on price levels, the inflation rate provides information only on past monetary
policy. To assess current policy, one needs to compare it against inflation performance one
or two years in the future, a statistic that is not available. An intermediate target is
generally used to try to express future inflation developments in terms of
contemporaneously observable variables. Several variables can be used for this purpose,
such as the exchange rate, monetary or credit aggregates, or other indicators of future
inflation, depending on their effective relationship to the price level. The announcement of
the target enables the public to monitor how the central bank is reacting to inflationary
pressures, as reflected in these indicators. It can thus check whether the central bank is
sticking to its price stability objective. The setting of an intermediate target requires that
there are variables that enable, with some degree of precision, to forecast future inflation.
This is an empirical question. If there is no variable closely related to future price
developments, the central bank may use its own inflation forecast as a target, as is done
under a direct inflation targeting strategy.
The fourth criterion is the announcement of indicators for assessing the
appropriateness of monetary policy. Given that it is generally difficult to find one single
variable that enables the targeting of future inflation, central banks use indicators to
interpret possible deviations from the intermediate target and to assess whether a policy
reaction is granted. Disclosing information on these indicators helps market participants to
understand how the central bank interprets inflation forecasts and deviations from the
intermediate target. An excessive amount of indicators may however confuse the picture
and give the impression that the central bank wants to pick the indicator it prefers,
depending on circumstances, to justify its own behavior. The statement that central banks
‘look at everything’ is not very informative for market participants.
The fifth criterion is the explanation of how monetary policy targets affect other
policies and objectives. Even if the primary objective is price stability, central banks may
pursue secondary objectives, such as supporting the economic policies of the government.
Providing a forecast and an assessment of inflationary trends may help the public to clearly
distinguish between the responsibilities of the various policy-making institutions and to
create transparency in the dialogue between them.156
The second group of criteria defines the ex-post accountability of the central bank
with respect to its pre-announced targets and indicators. They include the following:
•  Publication of data on intermediate variables and explanation of possible deviation from
target;
•  Publication of an inflation forecast and possible deviation from the target;
•  Explanation of the main policy measures, or absence thereof, and underlying reasons;
and
•  Explanation of how these measures affect other policies.
The publication of these data and the explanation of the main developments related
to the target variables and the analysis leading to the policy decisions is a way to enhance
the transparency of the decisions and thus the accountability of the central bank.
The third group of accountability criteria refers to the procedures followed by the
central bank to meet the above criteria. The procedure may include the issuing of public
reports in which the central bank provides data on its targets and indicators and explains its
policies, their underlying reasons and how well it has performed in view of the pre-
announced targets. Reporting also can be made through testimony presented in hearings
before Parliament by members of the decision-making body. These presentations are
generally less technical but allow, through the question and answer sessions, for a more
articulated assessment. The participation of the government in meetings of the decision-
making body is another opportunity through which institutions exchange information and
views on each other’s policies. Although market participants are not necessarily informed
about such exchanges, it may be reflected in the respective policies.
Finally, the background analysis and reasoning for the central bank’s decision-
making can be made available through the publication of the minutes of the meeting of the
decision-making body, in either an abridged or full version. This information can be
disaggregated up to the level of each member of the decision-making body, by making
public the votes of the individual members. This raises the question of whether
accountability is required for the central bank as a whole or for each member of the
decision-making body; it relates to the issue of collective vs. individual accountability,
which is addressed in the next section.
As has already been mentioned, this list of criteria should not be used to construct
an index of central bank accountability. Indeed, some of these criteria are complementary
and cover overlapping issues. Furthermore, the list is not exhaustive nor has it been drawn
up on the basis of a normative analysis of accountability but rather on the observation of
certain practices in some central banks and the discussion that has taken place in academic
and policy fora.
4. How accountable is the ECB?
There is as yet little literature that attempts to assess the accountability of the ECB.
13 There
are at least two difficulties with such an exercise. The first difficulty is that, as mentioned
above, the assessment can only be of a qualitative, rather than quantitative nature. The
criteria outlined in the previous sections are to be considered as references to help157
understand the main issues at stake rather than pointers to rank central banks. Furthermore,
these criteria need to be examined collectively, and in the broad institutional context within
which the central bank operates. The second difficulty is that the ECB has not been
operating for a very long time.
In light of these caveats, we try to examine the possible accountability of the ECB,
in comparison with the experience of three other major central banks – the Federal Reserve
in the US, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England – the latter two having recently
experienced a change in their statutes, in particular with a view to increasing both
independence and accountability. Again, the comparison is not aimed at ranking the central
banks, but at assessing the accountability of the ECB in the light of its counterparts’
experiences.
Table 1 indicated the extent to which these three major central banks and the ECB
meet the various criteria and in what length of time.
Concerning the first criterion, the ECB has publicly announced its definition of
price stability, with a view to enhancing transparency and credibility: a rate of inflation
lower than 2 per cent. The harmonized consumer price index, as calculated by Eurostat, is
the measured variable. The reference level takes into account measurement problems
encountered in measuring inflation. The ECB has also explained that the lack of a lower
bound for inflation does not imply that a reduction in the price level is deemed to be
consistent with price stability. Deflation is not price stability.
The ECB makes no explicit reference to time in its definition of price stability. It
has only stated that price stability is an objective to be achieved over the medium run – a
term that is clearly lacking in specificity with respect to the explicit objective. For instance,
if a shock pushes inflation above the 2 per cent level, thus breaching the definition of price
stability, what is the time frame in which the ECB is expected to restore price stability?
The lack of an inflation forecast, as indicated below, leaves wide margins of discretion to
the ECB to decide, without disclosing it to the public, the pace of disinflation.
The Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan do not announce precise objectives for
inflation rate. The Fed has developed a non-quantitative definition of the concept of price
stability, being a rate of change of the price level which does not induce economic agents
to modify their behavior. This concept does not make it easy for market participants to
understand the policy intentions of the Fed. It should be recalled that the statutory objective
of the Fed is not only to achieve price stability, but also to promote economic activity and
employment.
14 The Bank of England has a clear target, in terms of price inflation, which is
set by the government with the budget law, and can be modified year-by-year. The problem
of time inconsistency of monetary policy has thus been shifted away from the central bank
to the government. The time horizon of the policy objective is limited and can thus conflict
with the constraints arising from political business cycle considerations.
Concerning the second and third criteria, related to the operational and
intermediate targets, the ECB has set the overnight money market rate as its operational
target. The instruments of the Eurosystem are: the overnight lending and deposit facilities,
whose rates will determine the ceiling and the floor for the overnight rate; the weekly158
repurchase agreement, with bi-weekly maturity; and fine-tuning operations, largely based
on repos. All operations of the ESCB have to be conducted against collateral.
Concerning the intermediate target, the ECB has not followed the advice given by
its predecessor, the EMI. The latter suggested that among the indispensable elements of
any strategy adopted by the ECB should be ‘the public announcement of a specific target
(or targets) against which performance can be assessed on an ongoing basis by the general
public, thereby enhancing accountability’.
15 The ECB instead has chosen to refer to a
reference growth rate for M3. No clear explanation has been given about the operational
role that such a monetary reference should play in the ECB's strategy. It is obviously not an
intermediate target, not even in the way the Bundesbank has intended it to serve in the past,
that is, as a main explanatory factor for policy decisions.
The Fed and the Bank of Japan have no intermediate targets: the Bank of England
publishes an inflation forecast, which de facto represents its intermediate target.
As for other indicators of the ECB monetary policy, they encompass all relevant
financial variables (in particular, the money market yield curve, money and credit
aggregates, credit market conditions, bond yields, exchange rates and other asset prices) as
well as various non-financial variables (price and cost variables, indicators of aggregate
demand and supply conditions, etc.). None of these indicators has been given particular
importance, with a view to establishing a hierarchy of information variables for market
participants. The impression that the ECB will look at everything, which is equivalent to
not disclosing any information, has not being dispelled. The Fed uses monitoring ranges for
money and credit aggregates, although their importance has been strongly downgraded in
recent years. The Bank of England also uses a set of indicators to assess its own inflation
forecasts, but no specific one is given particular importance.
Finally, the ECB has been requested, in particular by the European Parliament, to
explain how the conduct of its policy interacts with other policies and affects economic
developments in the European Community. This practice is undertaken more or less
explicitly by all central banks, in the context of cooperation with other economic policy
authorities and with a view to ensuring the consistency of the respective policy plans. The
appropriateness of the policy-mix and its consequences on the economy as a whole, are
often a matter of public debate. In the European Community, the interaction between
monetary and other policies will be an input to the regular multilateral surveillance
exercise. Once a year, broad guidelines are defined by the Council of EU Finance Ministers
for the conduct of the economic policies of the member states. The Council then monitors
the policies of the member states, with a view to ensuring their consistency with the above
guidelines. The monetary policy conducted by the Eurosystem represents an important
reference for the definition of policy guidelines.
Turning to the ex-post criteria, the ECB regularly publishes data on the relevant
monetary aggregate. Given the unclear role that the latter plays in the monetary strategy,
however, the explanation of its behavior is of doubtful relevance to market participants.
Concerning criterion 7, the ECB does not intend for the moment to publish its own
inflation forecast. The justification offered is that:159
There are conceptual difficulties in formulating forecasts conditioned on unchanged
policies since some financial market indicators which provide input to these forecasts are
typically influenced by the markets’ anticipated stance of monetary policy over the
forecasting horizon. Furthermore, there is a risk that publishing inflation forecasts may,
at times, have adverse effects on financial markets and wage and price setting and that
the credibility of the ESCB could be damaged in the medium-term if the conditional
nature of the forecasts is not well explained. In this respect, it is seen as crucial that the
ESCB be fully independent in its decisions on policy actions and not in apparent need of
a published inflation forecast to convince the public about the appropriateness of its
decisions. In view of such considerations, most EU central banks, including most of
those targeting inflation directly, do not, at present, provide quantitative forecasts for
future inflation rates to the public. Yet, even if quantitative inflation forecasts are not
revealed it will be desirable to publish some form of information on inflation prospects,
and this should include a discussion of the perceived risks around the central inflation
projection’ (EMI, 1997, p. 16).
This justification is not convincing. Producing an inflation forecast is undoubtedly
a difficult exercise, especially at the start of monetary union in view of the wide
uncertainties. Nevertheless, the ECB will have in any case to make its own forecasts for the
purpose of taking policy decisions. Not revealing to the public the background analysis that
has led to policy decisions suggests that the ECB wants to hide information. This is
unjustified from any relevant viewpoint. As suggested in the previous sections, the public
at large, social partners and the governments of the euro zone can only benefit from the
information provided from the ECB. For instance, in conducting wage negotiations, social
partners need to make reference to an inflation forecast. Such a forecast, prior to monetary
union, was based on the national government targets or projections. In the Eurozone,
national governments have lost competence on inflation. Without some indication from the
ECB of the inflation forecast for the contract period, social partners have less information
than in the past with which to conduct negotiations. This reduces efficiency in the
European economy.
The explanation of policy decisions (criterion 8) is an important element of the
accountability of a central bank. As shown in Table 1, all central banks conduct this
exercise. This task may be simpler and better understood by the public, the more
transparent are the targets and the operational functions of the central bank. The frequency
and content of the decision-making process are also factors that may affect accountability.
For instance, in the case of the Fed, given that the FOMC meets only every six weeks, the
explanations to be provided to the public have to take into account the fact that the object
of the decision is a policy guideline for the Fed fund rate for the following 6 weeks, a
relatively long period of time. Such a guideline needs to take into account contingencies for
unforeseen possible developments and has therefore to be rather complex in nature. This
complexity is one of the main reasons why the Fed requests that the guidelines be kept
secret for at least one month.
16
Since the ECB Governing Council meets frequently, the decisions regarding the
main refinancing operations and the interest rate corridor (rates on marginal lending and
overnight deposit facilities) leave little scope for discretion in the interval between160
meetings. The announcement of the key rates thus contains nearly all the relevant
information concerning the ongoing policy. It is certainly more transparent than a broad
guideline for a market-determined rate to be implemented in the following month, as in the
case of the Fed. In summary, the frequency with which the decision-making body meets
and the operational framework adopted by the ECB ensures a relatively high degree of
transparency on decisions, compared to other central banks.
Turning to the procedures for making information available to the public or the
other policy authorities, there is a broadly similar situation across central banks with
respect to regular public reports or hearings in Parliament or Congress. The quality of the
reporting may vary, depending also on the requirements at the receiving end, that is, the
needs of the public at large, the academic and market practitioner or the Parliament. A
striking feature of the first ECB monthly reports is that not only do they not contain
forecasts, but the analysis is mainly backward-looking. Little or no indication is provided
as to future developments, which are those most relevant for monetary policy decisions.
This is not a good sign for accountability and transparency.
It has also been pointed out that the accountability of the ECB may be impaired by
the fact that the European Parliament is not sufficiently representative of the European
constituency. Others have suggested that the ECB is not sufficiently challenged in the
course of its hearings before the European Parliament, compared to the experience, for
example, of the Federal Reserve with the US Congress. Only experience will whether how
the European Parliament will live up to expectations.
Concerning criterion 12, the participation, but not the right to vote, of a member or
a representative of the executive branch of government in the meetings of the central
bank’s decision-making body is foreseen for the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England
but not for the Federal Reserve. For the ECB, the invitation is extended not only to the
President of the Council of the EU Finance Ministers but also to the European
Commission. This raises two problems.
The first is that the Presidency rotates every six months, which poses problems of
continuity and of transmission of information across countries and across time. In addition,
in periods when the Presidency is held by a country not participating in the euro area, a
problem of confidentiality may arise. Furthermore, the choice of whether to attend is left to
the Presidency of the Council, and may thus vary. When the President of the Council
attends, he should keep the Finance Ministers of the other member states informed about
the discussion in the ECB Governing Council, with a view to ensuring a level playing field.
The second issue is linked to the publication of the detailed minutes of the meeting
of the ECB Governing Council, and in particular the voting record. Such publication is
foreseen in the case of the Fed (7 weeks later for the voting, 5 years later for the detailed
minutes), the Bank of Japan (one month later) and the Bank of England (6 weeks later).
The Maastricht Treaty forbids the ECB from publishing the detailed minutes and votes, as
Article 10.4 of the Statute states: ‘The proceedings of the meetings shall be confidential.
The Governing Council may decide to make the outcome of its deliberations public’. Only
the outcome of the decision, not the procedure, may be made public. It is the ECB as a161
whole which is held accountable, not each of the individual components of its decision-
making body.
Two questions arise. The first is whether the publication of the minutes really
increases accountability. It certainly cannot reduce it, but what is really important here is
that the discussions leading to a policy decision are as open as possible. If the impression
were created that some arguments, if made public, could be used against the members of
the ECB Governing Council or create distorted perceptions of financial markets,
discussions would become constrained and not result in efficient decision-making.
Ultimately, the true discussions would take place beforehand, in informal meetings, while
the formal discussion would be largely ‘sanitized’. The minutes of the FOMC meetings
provide scant details of dissenting arguments.
The second question concerns the reason for collective, rather than individual
accountability. This choice derives from several factors. The first is that the members of the
ECB Governing Council are nominated through different procedures: the Governors of the
NCBs through national procedures; the members of the Executive Board through a
European procedure, specified in the treaty (Art. 109a2). This is a rather different situation
than that of any other central bank. A second aspect is that the ECB’s primary objective is
that of maintaining price stability in the euro area as a whole. The ECB is not responsible
for national price developments. Each member of the ECB Governing Council should thus
in principle have the same “European” objective. This is confirmed not only by the
provisions related to the personal and institutional independence of the ECB governing
body, but also by the voting system: one man, one vote.
Considering the two aspects jointly, a tension can be observed between the
expectation that the ECB has a ‘European’ objective (price stability in the euro area) and
fact that the members of its decision-making body are not nominated on the basis of a fully
‘European’ procedure. A system of individual accountability, by which each member of the
ECB Governing Council was individually accountable, would raise the problem of the
body to which they should be accountable. It would not be consistent for an NCB Governor
to account for his actions, in particular his vote, taken with a view to a ‘European interest’,
to a body such as a national Parliament or a national government, which represents national
interests. A national political body has no authority to judge how the accountee has
performed in his ‘European’ task. The accountability of the ECB is not the sum of the
national accountabilities of the members of its Governing Council.
It could be envisaged that the members of the ECB Governing Council are
individually accountable only to the European Parliament or to the European Council. The
European political bodies (Parliament and Council) however, play no role in the
appointment of NCB Governors. Their membership in the ECB Governing Council is
automatic, not subject to an act of confirmation by a European body (as in the case of the
Court of Justice or the Commission). The European Parliament does not organize hearings
to confirm the appointments of the Governors of the NCBs. It would thus be peculiar to
request the NCB Governors to be accountable to the European Parliament.
Only the members of the Executive Board could be individually accountable to the
European bodies that have nominated them. But it would not make much sense to publish162
only the votes of the ECB Executive Board members, while the others are kept secret;
individual accountability would then be required of only some members. In summary,
given the peculiar nature of the ECB and its decision-making bodies, its members cannot
be individually accountable. The solution that has been chosen is to have a collegiate
accountability for the whole ECB Governing Council to the European political bodies.
Such collegiality makes confidentiality of proceedings necessary, as called for in the
Maastricht Treaty.
The interplay between the fact that the President of the Council participates in the
meetings of the ECB Governing Council and the requirement of confidentiality of the
voting system in the latter may create the peculiarity that confidentiality on ECB
deliberations is ensured only with respect to the public at large, and not with the Council of
Ministers. Unless the requirement of confidentiality were extended to the President of the
Council of EU Ministers, vis-à-vis the other EU Finance Ministers, there would be an
asymmetry of information. That is, the governments of the member states, but not the
public nor the market participants, would know how the various members of the Governing
Council have voted. This might not be fully consistent with collegiate accountability and
transparency, and would encourage the search for private information about the behavior of
the various members of the ECB Governing Council.
5. Conclusions
On the basis of the treaty’s requirements, one would think that the ECB is more
accountable than most other central banks. For example, it must make regular reports to the
European Parliament. In its early operations, however, the ECB has shown less
accountability than one would have expected. Much effort is needed to improve on the
present situation which looks unsatisfactory.
Contrary to some suggestions, the way to improve the accountability of the ECB is
not to ask it to publish detailed minutes of the ECB Governing Council meetings. This
would only result in shifting the true debate to informal meetings of the Governing
Council, so that the formal meetings would only record pre-packaged consensus with no or
little discussion. The minutes would become irrelevant.
One way to make the ECB more accountable is to engage it in substantive
discussions where it is pressed to provide the relevant information about the background
analysis that have led to policy decisions. For example, the ECB should be pressed to make
its inflation forecast public.
Accountability cannot be ensured by the ECB alone. An important role has to be
played by its counterparts, such as the European Parliament, the Council of EU Finance
Ministers and the public at large. The hearings for the nomination of the ECB Executive
Board held in May 1998 suggest that the European Parliament intends to give serious
attention to this task. However, much more is required to counteract the impression of
inadequate accountability, which would ultimately lead to constraints on the independence
of the ECB.163
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Notes
1. It is interesting to note that during the debate in the European Parliament on ‘Democratic
accountability in stage three of EMU’, the French, Italian and Portuguese versions of the draft
report initially used the term contrôle démocratique, controllo democratico and controlo
democrático, respectively, while the Spanish version referred instead to responsabilidad
democrática. The texts were later harmonized with the use of the word responsibility.
2. See Roll et al. (1993).
3. CEPR (1993), pp. 48-49.
4. See, in particular, Persson and Tabellini (1993), Walsh (1995) and McCallum (1995).
5. See Briault et al. (1996).
6. See Kydland and Prescott (1997) and Barro and Gordon (1983a and 1983b).
7. See Cukierman and Metzler (1986) and Garfinkel and Oh (1995).
8. See, for example, Canzoneri (1985).
9. Goodfriend (1986) presents in a critical way the arguments of the Fed in its case against
Merrill.
10. See Faust and Svensson (1998) for a formal proof of these propositions.
11. The issue is already debated in the literature; see Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998).
12. A formal derivation of this reasoning can be found in Demertzis et al. (1998).
13. See, in particular, Gorwley and De Haan (1996) and De Haan (1997).
14. As defined in the act establishing the Federal Reserve System, the tasks of the Fed is to
‘furnish an elastic currency...so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
stable prices and moderate interest rates’.
15. European Monetary Institute (1997), p. 10.
16. See Goodfriend (1996).